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The NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led several expendable launch 
vehicle (ELV) projects from 1963 to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper stage. These 
major, comprehensive projects included system management, system development, 
integration (both payload and stage), and launch operations. The integration role that GRC 
pioneered was truly unique and highly successful. Its philosophy, scope, and content were 
not just invaluable to the missions and vehicles it supported, but also had significant Agency-
wide benefits. An overview of the NASA Lewis Research Center (now the NASA Glenn 
Research Center) philosophy on ELV integration is provided, focusing on Atlas/Centaur, 
Titan/Centaur, and Shuttle/Centaur vehicles and programs. The necessity of having a stable, 
highly technically competent in-house staff is discussed. Significant depth of technical 
penetration of contractor work is another critical component. Functioning as a cohesive 
team was more than a concept: GRC senior management, NASA Headquarters, contractors, 
payload users, and all staff worked together. The scope, content, and history of launch 
vehicle integration at GRC are broadly discussed. Payload integration is compared to stage 
development integration in terms of engineering and organization. Finally, the transition 
from buying launch vehicles to buying launch services is discussed, and thoughts on future 
possibilities of employing the successful GRC experience in integrating ELV systems like 
Centaur are explored. 
Nomenclature 
AC = Atlas/Centaur  
ADDJUST = Automatic Determination and Dissemination of Just Updated Steering Terms 
CISS =  Centaur Integrated Support System 
CRRES = Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite 
ELV = expendable launch vehicle 
EOS = Earth Observing System 
ERB = Engineering Review Board 
FLTSATCOM = Fleet Satellite Communications 
GFE = government-furnished equipment 
GOES = Geosynchronous Operational Environmental Satellite 
GRC = Glenn Research Center 
HQ = Headquarters 
IUS = inertial upper stage 
IV&V = independent verification and validation 
JSC = Johnson Space Center 
KSC = Kennedy Space Center 
LeRC = Lewis Research Center 
LH2 = liquid hydrogen 
LOX = liquid oxygen 
RF = radiofrequency 
RTG =  radioisotope thermoelectric generator 
SC = Shuttle/Centaur 
SEP = solar electric propulsion 
SOHO = Solar and Heliospheric Observatory 
ULA = United Launch Alliance 
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I. Introduction 
HE NASA Glenn (then Lewis) Research Center (GRC) led and managed several expendable launch vehicle 
(ELV) projects from 1963 to 1998, most notably the Centaur upper stage. These major, comprehensive 
projects included system management, system development, integration (both payload and stage), and launch 
operations. The integration role that GRC pioneered was truly unique and highly successful. Its philosophy, scope, 
and content were not just invaluable to the mission and vehicles it supported, but also had significant Agency-wide 
benefits that might also be useful to future NASA activities. 
NASA’s Centaur upper stage was the first of a new generation of space vehicles that pioneered the use of liquid 
hydrogen as a fuel for space flight rocket engines. The Centaur upper stage was developed by NASA Lewis 
Research Center, now Glenn Research CenterI in Cleveland, Ohio. The Centaur became the world’s first high-
energy upper stage, burning liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX) to place payloads in geosynchronous 
orbits or provide escape velocity for interplanetary space probes. In combination with the RL10 rocket engine 
(currently manufactured by Aerojet Rocketdyne), the Centaur became (and still is today) the highest performing 
upper stage and one of the most prominent launch vehicles in America’s exploration of space. Centaur has launched 
over 200 payloads, most notably the Surveyor landers to the Moon (a precursor to the Apollo lunar landings), the 
Pioneer and Voyager spacecraft to the outer planets, the Viking landers and the Curiosity rover to the surface of 
Mars, Cassini to the rings of Saturn, and the New Horizons probe to Pluto. Centaur has also launched dozens of 
communication satellites into geosynchronous orbit.  
The Centaur upper stage was developed and manufactured by General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division 
(later renamed to Space Systems Division) under the direction of NASA’s LeRC. The Centaur Program started in 
1958 with its first successful flight (AC-2) on November 27, 1963, from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in 
Florida. Since then the vehicle has undergone numerous evolutionary upgrades and modifications to improve its 
performance, operability, and reliability. Centaur has flown as the upper stage for both the Atlas and Titan launch 
vehicles, and continues flying today as the upper stage for the Atlas V. Last year (November 2013) marked the 50th 
anniversary of the first successful flight of Centaur. In the early 1980s, NASA embarked upon a large effort to 
modify Centaur to safely fly as a high-energy upper stage inside the space shuttle cargo bay for NASA missions 
such as Galileo and Ulysses, and certain Department of Defense missions. This program, known as Shuttle/Centaur, 
was cancelled in 1986 shortly after the Space Shuttle Challenger accident, just a few months prior to the planned 
first launch in May 1986. The Centaur G-prime upper stage developed for the Shuttle/Centaur program later flew as 
a new upper stage for Titan IV. 
This paper will reflect on NASA GRC’s unique and highly successful role in managing and integrating ELVs, 
with emphasis on the Centaur upper stage development and integration with Atlas, Titan, and the space shuttle. 
II. LeRC Philosophy on Centaur/ELV Integration 
LeRC’s management philosophy for launch vehicle integration was centered on having a robust and highly 
competent in-house technical staff working in partnership with contractor personnel and the launch organizations. A 
true government-industry team was developed in which each organization supported, stimulated, and challenged the 
other to produce a whole that was greater than the sum of the parts. The government-industry team was highly 
experienced and dedicated to mission success, with considerable pride and confidence that served to maintain a high 
level of morale and motivation.  
With its acknowledged technical leadership, LeRC evolved into a position of manager and system integrator of 
associate contractors, supplying the guidance subsystem and RL10 engines as government-furnished equipment 
(GFE) to General Dynamics Convair as the prime integrating contractor. This mode of operation was well conceived 
and highly successful for many years, up until LeRC’s ELV program transitioned into procuring launch services 
from industry. Up until that transition, LeRC managed separate contracts with General Dynamics Convair (multiple 
contracts), Teledyne (Centaur digital computer), Honeywell (Centaur guidance), Pratt & Whitney (Centaur RL10 
engines), and Rocketdyne (Atlas MA-5 engines). These associate contractors delivered flight-qualified hardware to 
LeRC that was then furnished to General Dynamics in San Diego. Figure 1 shows the Centaur program organization 
in 1980 including the LeRC-managed contracts. 
 
I On March 1, 1999 NASA’s Lewis Research Center (LeRC or Lewis) in Cleveland, Ohio, was officially renamed 
the John H. Glenn Research Center at Lewis Field ( GRC or Glenn). Because of the historical nature of this paper 
both center names, Lewis (LeRC) and Glenn (GRC), are used interchangeably herein. 
T 
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The experience, depth of technical penetration, 
and familiarity of the LeRC project staff with the 
Atlas/Centaur vehicle was a major strength of the 
program. This supplied both a “corporate memory” 
and person-to-person familiarity with their 
counterparts among the contractors.1 As an 
example of this technical penetration and 
government-industry partnership, LeRC assigned a 
highly competent engineer to be the system 
engineer for the RL10 rocket engine and worked on 
a day-to-day basis with his counterparts at Pratt & 
Whitney and General Dynamics. This government-
industry engineering counterpart arrangement was 
repeated for most every major system and 
subsystem (hydraulic, pneumatic, guidance, 
computer, avionic, structure, thermal, etc.…). This 
not only provided a tightly coupled government-
industry team, but also provided the government 
with significant technical penetration into all 
aspects of the designs and hardware. It also served 
as a check-and-balance system to assure mission success. Many times the LeRC system engineer was more 
knowledgeable about a particular issue, component, or design feature than his industry counterpart. Responsibilities 
of the GRC launch vehicle systems engineers, assigned as a technical specialist for a particular system or subsystem, 
included2 
 Mission integration interfaces 
 Problem solving 
 Evaluation and qualification testing 
 Factory acceptance 
 “Tiger Team” product reviews 
 Flight readiness status 
 Launch support 
 Flight data reduction analysis 
 Flight report 
 Contract support 
 Liaison with contractor and Kennedy Space Center (KSC) counterparts 
 
Atlas/Centaur is an extremely complex vehicle with minimal redundancy, and flight success required an unusual 
degree of both care and familiarity on the part of all system and subsystem engineers.3 Flight failures were often not 
caused by gross design flaws but by things being forgotten or “slipping through the crack.”4 
“The technical penetration by the Lewis project team was more than just monitoring and directing the contractors to 
ensure that they do a good job. When competence in government meets competence in industry, a synergism occurs: the 
whole is greater than the sum of the parts. Each party stimulates and challenges the other to a higher level of care and 
diligence than would otherwise be obtained. The success of Atlas/Centaur could not have been achieved by either 
government or industry alone.”3 
 
LeRC’s philosophy for Centaur mission success was also built on a foundation of extensive ground testing in the 
relevant environment—from components, to subsystems, systems, to the complete vehicle. Types of testing 
conducted included engine hot fire tests, separation, vibration, structural, etc… LeRC’s emphasis on ground testing, 
coupled with an experienced technical staff and unique test facilities were critical to the successful development and 
operation of the Centaur.5 Figure 2 shows a Centaur upper stage being lowered into position for testing at LeRC. 
 
Figure 1. Centaur Program organization showing LeRC-
managed contracts (circa 1980). 
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Figure 2. A Centaur stage being readied for testing. 
 
As problems arose, LeRC’s program 
philosophy was to maintain close contact with 
the contractor’s engineering and quality 
personnel for awareness and resolution. 
Engineering Review Boards (ERBs) were often 
conducted by both the contractor and LeRC. 
Sometimes joint NASA-industry ERBs were 
conducted for particular problems. A very 
formal, well-documented process existed for 
conducting business and reviews. Both industry 
and LeRC management were kept well informed 
of current status, problems, and problem 
resolution activities. Senior management was 
tightly engaged with the systems engineering and 
quality assurance personnel, to ensure no 
surprises. The engineering and project 
management organizations at GRC were within 
the same Directorate, not matrixed. This “stove-
piped” organization was effective in focusing 
experienced engineers on solving problems in a timely fashion. Figure 3 shows the LeRC Launch Vehicles Division 
organization in 1980. Lower level organization “sections” are not shown. Launch vehicle staffing levels at GRC 
fluctuated around 100 to 150 people for the majority of the years. (There was a ramp up to near 250 people in the 
early 1980s for Shuttle/Centaur development.) In the early 1980s, GRC began augmenting its civil servant staff with 
on-site engineering support contractors. Throughout GRC’s leadership of launch vehicles and Centaur, the Center 
maintained and staffed a resident office at General Dynamics in San Diego and later at Lockheed Martin in Denver. 
GRC also maintained an on-site presence at other associate contractor locations. Likewise, the major contractors 
maintained a local representative in Cleveland, near GRC. GRC staff also cochaired technical working groups and 
panels in key areas along with their contractor counterparts. GRC staff sometimes shared operational work 
responsibilities with contractor staff during critical launch preparation periods. Functioning as a cohesive team was 
more than a concept—where GRC upper management, NASA Headquarters (HQ), contractors, payload users, and 
all staff worked together as a team, not as government versus contractor. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. LeRC Launch Vehicles Division organization 
(circa 1980). 
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LeRC’s approach to launch vehicle integration and mission success rejected the approach of contracting out all 
technical and engineering matters to industry. LeRC’s approach was much more than simply providing contract 
management, oversight, and insight. LeRC’s deep technical penetration into all aspects of the vehicle, an 
engineering staff comparable to the contractor’s staff, and working in close partnership and collaboration with 
industry, helped ensure a highly successful program for many decades. Attention to detail was paramount. The 
LeRC team brought hands-on experience coupled with equal-to or superior analytic tools and testing facilities 
compared with the contractors. LeRC’s trajectory optimization, mission design, and coupled loads analysis tools are 
but a few examples of LeRC’s superior tools. The Center’s large-scale vacuum chambers for hot fire engine and 
stage testing (at altitude conditions) of Centaur during its early development were crucial to the success of the 
program. 
GRC’s philosophy for Centaur flight software was to design and structure it to be very flexible and “robust.” It 
could compensate for very large in-flight dispersions or even for some hardware anomalies. For example, it could 
initiate main engine restart sequences, recover from very high tumble rates after Centaur engine shutdown, and 
retarget in flight. The software was able to respond to many hardware dispersions or anomalies. Three examples of 
this philosophy are briefly explained here. First, if a Centaur main engine failed to start, software initiated a main 
engine restart sequence. This software capability was actually invoked on the first Titan/Centaur flight, a test flight 
where the Centaur engines failed to start after separation from Titan. The software initiated an engine restart 
sequence, but the engines still failed to start for hardware reasons. Second, in the event of very high Centaur/payload 
tumble rates after Centaur engine shutdown (i.e., during coasting) special software initiated commands to recover 
control of the vehicle, even if it meant that the vehicle rotated through 360° before control was regained. It had been 
shown analytically that this approach was preferable to running out of attitude control propellant trying to null the 
high rate quickly and then returning to the proper attitude. And finally, if on-board guidance and navigation 
calculations indicated that the desired target was unreachable because of some anomaly earlier in flight, a new target 
would actually be computed in flight using an onboard algorithm. This retarget would result in a compromised 
mission, (e.g., a lower orbital altitude), but such a mission was preferable to losing the spacecraft by running out of 
propellant before reaching orbit trying to achieve the original nominal target.  
III. Scope and Content of Integration 
As the NASA lead Center for management of intermediate- and large-class ELVs (such as Atlas/Centaur and 
Titan/Centaur), GRC was responsible for ensuring that the total launch vehicle and mission integration tasks and 
activities were properly coordinated and conducted in support of the mission.6 These integration tasks and activities 
included the following: 
 
 Integrated launch vehicle performance and trajectory analyses 
 Integrated launch vehicle loads analyses 
 Integrated launch vehicle thermal analyses 
 Integrated guidance accuracy analyses 
 Launch vehicle guidance and flight control integration 
 Integrated launch vehicle radiofrequency (RF) analyses 
 Integrated launch vehicle range and pad safety analyses, including flight termination 
 Integrated launch vehicle range planning and data acquisition 
 Integrated launch vehicle operations support 
 Overall launch vehicle schedule integration 
 Launch vehicle systems trade studies 
  
A standardized integration panel structure was utilized for each mission. For most missions there were three 
panels: Mission Integration, Mission Design, and Ground Operations. For planetary or deep-space missions, a 
radioisotope thermoelectric generator (RTG) panel was frequently required. All the panels were cochaired by GRC 
launch vehicle personnel. The ground operations panel was cochaired by KSC and GRC. Each panel had well-
documented responsibilities. These panels were sometimes referred to as working groups. As shown in Figure 4, 
these panels were typically established about 3 years prior to launch (L-3 Years) for each mission. 
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Figure 4. Typical mission integration process (circa 1996). 
 
The Mission Integration Panel, sometimes referred to as the Systems Integration Panel, was responsible for the 
overall management of the integration process, which included the following: 
 
 Systems safety 
 Systems effectiveness 
 Scheduling and planning 
 Action item review and status 
 Initiation/formation of working groups 
 Resolution of integration disagreements 
 Mechanical, electrical, and environmental interface requirements definition (flight and ground) 
 
Mission Integration Panel products included 
 
 Integration schedules 
 Safety documentation 
 Interface control documents and drawings, electrical and mechanical 
 Postflight reports 
 Flight certification assessment 
 
The Mission Design Panel was responsible for all aspects of mission design and operations between the launch 
vehicle and the payload/spacecraft, including 
 
 Assuring that all phases of mission design were consistent with performance, trajectory, guidance, and 
launch period requirements of the mission 
 Providing a means for continual compilation, interchange, review, and evaluation of relative data 
 Interpreting performance and guidance accuracy requirements and verifying that they were satisfied 
 Developing appropriate trajectory strategies to meet tracking and data acquisition constraints 
 Verifying nominal and contingency trajectory timelines and flight profiles 
 Supporting and providing inputs to interface control documents and other documents 
 Coordinating performance improvement studies and analyses 
 Developing and issuing performance tracking reports  
 Identifying and analyzing problems and determining possible courses of action and recommended solutions 
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The Ground Operation Panel was responsible for defining facility interfaces and services as well as defining and 
integrating ground operations including payload encapsulation and scheduling of launch operations from the time 
the launch vehicle and payload arrived at KSC through launch. Additional responsibilities included 
 
 Coordinating the preparation of all ground operation procedures 
 Verifying that all spacecraft ground support equipment is provided with proper services 
 Coordinating the preparation and approval of various spacecraft and launch vehicle program requirement 
documents 
 Reviewing and updating launch site schedules 
 Coordinating and communicating requirements among payload, launch vehicle, and NASA organizations 
 Coordinating launch site badging and security 
 Coordinating tracking and data acquisition requirements and services 
 Monitoring range safety activities leading up to range approval of mission flight plans 
 
For planetary or deep-space missions, the RTG panel was responsible for compiling and publishing a RTG safety 
data book in support of the environmental impact statement and safety analysis report. This included definition of 
launch vehicle accident scenarios, the resulting vehicle response, probability of occurrence, definition of 
environments resulting from accident scenarios, and identification of accident mitigation techniques to reduce the 
severity of accident environments. 
IV. Payload Integration Versus Stage Development Integration 
There were two different aspects of launch vehicle 
integration at GRC: payload/spacecraft integration and 
vehicle development integration. GRC managed over 119 
launches and integrated 80 different payloads or 
spacecraft with the Centaur upper stage. Beyond early 
development test flights, every launch vehicle 
(Atlas/Centaur and Titan/Centaur) managed by GRC had 
a payload or spacecraft that was integrated with the 
launch vehicle by GRC personnel working in 
collaboration with the payload provider and the launch 
vehicle contractor. Payloads included commercial 
spacecraft, such as the Intelsat series of communication 
satellites, military satellites such as Fleet Satellite 
Communications (FLTSATCOM) for the Department of 
Defense, and many NASA planetary and solar system 
spacecraft, such as the Surveyor and Mariner series, 
Pioneer, Viking, Voyager, Cassini, and the Solar and 
Heliospheric Observatory (SOHO). Figure 5 shows the 
launch of Surveyor 1 on AC-10 in May 1966. 
The nature of payload integration was very analytical 
and closely coupled with the mission design, vehicle 
performance, and the trajectory. Payload integration 
included making sure the spacecraft physically fit and 
interfaced properly with the launch vehicle and launch 
site ground support equipment and that the spacecraft 
would survive the environments induced by the launch 
vehicle during launch, such as temperatures, pressures, g-
forces, loads, vibration, and acoustic noise levels. Payload integration also included making sure the payload 
requirements for services from the launch vehicle or the launch pad were understood and provided. Typical payload 
services included providing access to the payload (if required) after it was encapsulated inside the payload fairing; 
environmental control (thermal conditioning, purge gas); prelaunch electrical power, data, and command; and other 
services provided to the spacecraft via umbilical connections from the launch pad tower to the payload. GRC 
payload integrators and mission integration managers were intimately familiar with the spacecraft requirements, 
 
Figure 5. Surveyor 1 launch on AC-10 (May 1966). 
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interfaces, and environmental design limits and worked to ensure the launch vehicle environments were compatible 
with the environments the spacecraft was designed to withstand, with adequate margin. 
In contrast to the 80 payloads that were integrated by GRC, integration of launch vehicle stages happened 
infrequently. For Centaur, there were only four substantially different versions developed for launch on three booster 
families over a 35-year period. These different Centaur configurations are commonly referred to as the 
Atlas/Centaur configuration, the Titan IIIE/Centaur configuration, and two Shuttle/Centaur configurations—the 
Centaur G and Centaur G-prime configurations. 
A new Centaur configuration was a major undertaking that involved all the contractors and NASA. It was during 
these vehicle redesign efforts that the value and benefit of the joint industry-GRC partnership and collaboration 
really shined, as it did from the very beginning during the initial design and development of the Centaur upper stage.  
Centaur was born out of the necessity to have a high-performance upper stage for the Atlas booster to launch the 
Surveyor robotic landers to the Moon as a precursor to the Apollo human landing missions. Centaur was the world’s 
first high-energy upper stage—the first to use LH2 and LOX as propellants, leveraging the remarkable and 
legendary RL10 rocket engine as its propulsion system and ultra-lightweight, very thin, pressure stabilized, stainless 
steel propellant tanks; that were separated by a common bulkhead. Atlas was originally developed by the United 
States Air Force as an intercontinental ballistic missile. Derivatives of Atlas were later used by the Air Force and 
then NASA for launching payloads (and eventually humans) into space. The Atlas booster used a refined kerosene 
RP-1 fuel and liquid oxygen as its oxidizer. NASA used Atlas as a booster for its Agena upper stage and for the 
Mercury-Atlas human missions (after the two Mercury Redstone launches of Alan Shepard and Virgil “Gus” 
Grissom). Atlas was used to launch John Glenn and the Friendship 7 Mercury capsule on his historic journey in 
February 1962. Three more Mercury-Atlas missions followed. GRC pioneered the use of LH2 as a high-energy 
propellant and led the development of the RL10 rocket engine with Pratt & Whitney and the Centaur upper stage 
with General Dynamics Convair. Atlas became the first booster for Centaur, and GRC led the integration of Centaur 
onto Atlas. The first successful Atlas/Centaur launch (AC-2) was in November 1963. Last year, in November 2013, 
many members of the GRC Centaur team gathered in Cleveland with their industry and payload partners and NASA 
senior managers to celebrate the 50th anniversary of the first successful Atlas/Centaur launch. Atlas and Centaur 
continue to fly today as the Atlas V ELV. It is not the scope of this paper to reflect in any more detail on the early 
development history of Atlas, Centaur, and the RL10 rocket engine. Those efforts are well described in the Taming 
Liquid Hydrogen historical book.7 
Examples of GRC’s contributions to the Atlas/Centaur integrated vehicle configuration included performing 
structural dynamic tests of the full-scale Atlas/Centaur with a dynamic Surveyor spacecraft model at LeRC’s 
E Stand at Plum Brook Station in the 1960s. These tests verified the dynamic models for loads, pogo, and autopilot 
stability analysis. Also in the 1960s GRC developed the Atlas vehicle ground wind damper and the linear-shaped 
charge for the separation system that separated Centaur from Atlas. GRC was also instrumental in the development 
of a new Atlas/Centaur nose fairing and fairing jettison system, which were tested at LeRC’s Space Power Facility 
at Plum Brook, the world’s largest vacuum chamber. In the 1970s GRC led the development of a computer-
controlled Centaur tank pressurization and vent system as well as the computer-controlled launch set (CCLS), the 
ground-based computer system used to monitor, calibrate, test, and display system status and redlines prior to 
launch. Another significant GRC accomplishment was the development, in close collaboration with General 
Dynamics, of a new launch-day wind-monitoring and vehicle-steering system in 1973 known as Automatic 
Determination and Dissemination of Just Updated Steering Terms (ADDJUST). The premise of ADDJUST was to 
use high-altitude wind data from weather balloons launched just prior to launch to provide up-to-date vehicle 
guidance and steering (pitch and yaw) parameters to the Centaur flight control computer 15-minutes before launch 
to steer the vehicle through the winds to minimize loads on the vehicle during ascent. The ADDJUST system 
dramatically reduced the number of launch scrubs due to upper-atmosphere winds and increased the number of days 
available for launch—especially during the winter season of high-upper-atmosphere winds in Florida. 
The Titan IIIE/Centaur D-1T configuration, developed in the early 1970s, had triple the payload capability of 
Atlas/Centaur. The development of Titan/Centaur was driven by the need to launch the heavy Viking landers to 
Mars in 1975. After its maiden test flight in February 1974 (which ended in failure when the Centaur RL10 engines 
failed to start), Titan IIIE/Centaur flew successfully six times, launching Viking 1 and 2, Voyager 1 and 2, and 
Helios 1 and 2. The last Titan IIIE/Centaur launch was Voyager 1 in September 1977.II Integrating Centaur with 
Titan proved to be a significant technical challenge. It required integrating together two vehicles, each with their 
own major aerospace company—General Dynamic’s Centaur with Martin Marietta’s Titan. Further complicating 
matters was the Air Force’s ownership and control of Titan IIIE and the Complex 41 launch pad and other Titan 
II Voyager 2 was launched 16 days before Voyager 1. 
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facilities at Cape Canaveral. GRC stepped up to lead the 
integration of Titan/Centaur, working in partnership with General 
Dynamics, Martin Marietta, KSC, and the Air Force. Figure 6 
shows the launch of Voyager 2 in 1977. 
GRC’s contributions to integrating Centaur with Titan IIIE 
included 
 
 Leading the integration efforts with the aerospace 
contractors, KSC and the Air Force 
 Development of the Titan Stage 1 oxidizer pogo 
suppression accumulator system 
 Integrating the ADDJUST system into Titan/Centaur. (All 
seven Titan IIIE/Centaur launches used ADDJUST.) 
 Development of a new payload shroud (Centaur Standard 
Shroud) for Titan/Centaur, including performing shroud 
jettison tests, including thermal vacuum tests, at Plum 
Brook 
 Development of the Centaur guidance system to guide, 
steer, and control Titan, using the Centaur digital computer 
and avionics systems 
 Development of a Centaur thermal radiation shield to 
enable in-space coasts for much longer periods (up to 5 h) 
than Atlas/Centaur. (Although developed and demonstrated 
on Helios, this capability was never needed or used for a 
mission.) 
 
Another challenge in integrating Centuar with Titan IIIE was the lack of clear and effective technical 
communication between the two major aerospace companies involved. The LeRC integration manager directed that 
a common database and set of definitions be established, documented, and maintained as the governing interface 
control drawings for the integration activity. This was no minor task because the two companies had differing 
cultures and design processes.8 In addition he directed that a complete structural and structural-dynamics analyses 
be conducted for the combined vehicle. This effort underscored the nature of the integration problems because the 
two companies did not use a common set of definitions for such analyses. The different cultures of Atlas and Titan 
programs proved a challenge for LeRC project managers. Air Force personnel were rotated every few years, a 
practice that prevented them from forming close personal relationships with their counterparts at Martin Marietta. In 
contrast, years of working together had produced a seamless relationship between LeRC and General Dynamics 
people.9 
The final major new Centaur configuration led and integrated by GRC was Shuttle/Centaur. In the early 1980s, 
NASA embarked upon a large effort to modify Centaur to fly safely as a high-energy upper stage inside the space 
shuttle cargo bay for NASA missions such as Galileo and Ulysses as well as certain Department of Defense 
missions. It is important to note that Shuttle/Centaur was very political in nature and that it began at around the time 
of the first space shuttle launch in 1981. At the beginning, Shuttle/Centaur was a political “hot potato” with the 
Agency cancelling it only to have Congress reinstate it. To better understand this, it is important to understand the 
environment of the late 1970s and early 1980s—the dawn of the space shuttle era and a tumultuous time for ELVs 
and Centaur. 
With the development of the space shuttle, which began in 1972, it became NASA’s official policy to terminate the 
use of all ELVs as soon as the space shuttle became available. As a result, for several years before the first space shuttle 
flight in 1981, the Atlas/Centaur program and the GRC-industry team was living and operating in a phase-out 
environment—an environment of near-term termination. In 1979 it appeared that AC-60, scheduled to launch in 1981, 
would be the very last Atlas/Centaur launch and the final Centaur mission. Around that time, the launch vehicle staff at 
GRC was reduced and planning was initiated to carry out the remaining launches in an orderly fashion and begin to 
phase-out all other engineering and sustaining activities.10 However in 1980, concern with space shuttle delays resulted 
in Intelsat requesting four more Atlas/Centaur launches that promised to extend the life of Atlas/Centaur for at least 
4 years. The program continued along with no long-range prospects and only being able to manage one or two missions 
at a time as they came to be. An attitude that NASA would allow the possible coexistence of ELVs with the space 
 
Figure 6. Titan IIIE/Centaur launch of 
Voyager 2 (1977). 
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shuttle started to emerge with a recommendation by the Atlas/Centaur Review Board in February 1981 that this 
become NASA policy.11 During this same time period, the Europeans entered the ELV market with their brand new 
Ariane launch vehicle. Ariane soon became a viable and competitive launch vehicle in the international market, 
creating additional pressures on the United States launch vehicle industry to remain competitive in a market they once 
dominated. This was the beginning of a shift towards recognizing the need for a robust, competitive, commercial space 
transportation industry, and the move towards commercializing ELVs in the United States began. This also marked the 
beginning of a shift within NASA from managing and buying ELVs (like Delta and Atlas/Centaur) to procuring launch 
services from industry. It would take several more years for this transition to occur, and GRC was at the forefront of 
making it happen. This transition from launch vehicles to launch services will be discussed in Section V of this paper. 
During this same time period (early 1981), as the space shuttle began to fly, it became apparent that the space 
shuttle needed a capability to launch payloads beyond low Earth orbit. The idea to redesign Centaur to fit inside the 
space shuttle was a radical idea that had been considered and studied in the 1970s, with a large integration study 
authorized by NASA HQ in 1979. The Shuttle/Centaur Program began in 1981 (albeit with low funding and an “on-
again/off-again” first couple of years) and was hailed as the “convergence of piloted and robotic spacecraft and the 
next step in launch vehicle evolution. In an era of cost cutting and declining space budgets, the combination of the 
shuttle with the world’s most powerful upper stage promised to give the United States a system of extraordinary 
power and versatility.”12 There was also at the time a competing upper stage concept for the shuttle, the Air Force’s 
solid propellant inertial upper stage (IUS) built by Boeing. A bitter political debate ensued between IUS camps 
(including Marshall Space Flight Center and its powerful delegation) and Centaur camps. 
Unfortunately, Shuttle/Centaur was fraught with controversy and Agency and inter-center politics. The Johnson 
Space Center (JSC) wanted Centaur to be managed as shuttle payload, as opposed to an element of the Space 
Transportation System. The mass of a fully tanked Centaur with its payload stretched the abort landing capabilities 
of the shuttle orbiter. This necessitated designing a complex propellant dump system to quickly dump the liquid 
hydrogen and liquid oxygen from the Centaur in the event of an emergency abort landing to reduce mass. There 
were numerous safety concerns associated with flying hydrogen and oxygen inside the cargo bay of the shuttle in 
close proximity to the crew and their only ride home—especially with these propellants stored inside the Centaur’s 
balloon-like pressure-stabilized tanks. In spite of those safety concerns, all the required safety precautions were 
addressed and all necessary emergency systems and redundancy plans were in place. In January 1986, 
Shuttle/Centaur SC-1 and SC-2 were only 4 months from launch (scheduled to launch 6 days apart in May 1986) 
and ready to be installed inside the Space Shuttle Challenger cargo bay for the Ulysses mission (SC-1) to the Sun 
and Space Shuttle Atlantis for the Galileo mission (SC-2) to Jupiter. However on January 28, 1986, the Space 
Shuttle Challenger tragically and catastrophically failed during launch and everything changed. The Agency became 
very risk adverse. The shuttle program was shut down for almost 3 years. The Shuttle/Centaur program was not 
officially terminated until June 19, 1986, but its uncertainty and fate were largely known soon after the Challenger 
accident. Figure 7 shows artist concepts of Centaur G-prime being deployed from the Shuttle cargo bay with the 
Galileo spacecraft payload. 
 
Figure 7. Artist concept of Shuttle/Centaur (with Galileo spacecraft) deployment from shuttle. 
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GRC comanaged the development of Shuttle/Centaur with the Air Force. Although there was low-level, “on-
again, off-again” activity and funding in 1981 and 1982, the program did not have significant funding and stability 
until 1983—only 3 years before the firmly scheduled first launch in May 1986. Meeting this schedule was critical 
for the program. The Galileo mission to Jupiter had to be launched within a 21-day window that month, or be 
delayed for over a year. GRC created the Shuttle/Centaur Project Office and hired additional staff. Launch vehicle 
staffing at GRC doubled to around 250 people in the mid-1980s during the peak of Shuttle/Centaur development. 
The Air Force maintained an on-site staff at GRC and was an integral, vital part of the Shuttle/Centaur Project 
Office. Together GRC and the Air Force comanaged the program including the integration of Centaur design and 
configuration changes to adapt the vehicle for the space shuttle platform and to ensure that Centaur addressed all 
human space flight requirements.  
There were two versions or configurations of Centaur developed for the shuttle: Centaur G and Centaur G-prime. 
The G-prime version was 30 ft long to accommodate 30-ft long payloads. The G version was 20 ft long and could 
accommodate payloads up to 40 ft long. This was a result of different requirements for NASA missions versus Air 
Force missions. NASA’s requirements were for a larger upper stage with the energy to achieve interplanetary 
velocity requirements. The Air Force requirements were for larger/longer payloads (40 ft) for Earth orbital missions. 
Both versions of Centaur were cradled inside the shuttle cargo bay in a device known as the Centaur Integrated 
Support System (CISS). The CISS was a major new systems development activity for the program. The CISS 
provided all of the mechanical, electrical, and fluid interfaces between the Centaur and the shuttle. The CISS not 
only supported the Centaur during space shuttle flights, it also provided the means to control and deploy the 
Centaur. With the cargo bay doors open, the CISS would rotate (pivot) the Centaur up and out of the cargo bay and 
then release it. The CISS was designed to be reusable and returned to Earth inside the shuttle cargo bay. Both 
versions of Centaur with the payload/spacecraft and the CISS filled the entire cargo bay of the space shuttle. The 
two space shuttle orbiters designated to carry Centaur, Challenger and Atlantis, also had to be modified for Centaur. 
These modifications included provisions for filling and draining the Centaur propellant tanks, venting the tanks, and 
dumping the tanks in the event of an abort landing. Figure 8 shows the first Centaur G-prime vehicle being 
processed for launch at KSC. The CISS can be seen in the photograph on the right, at the bottom. 
 
      
Figure 8. Shuttle/Centaur G-prime processing at Kennedy Space Center (CISS also shown at right). 
 
There were many design changes and modifications required for Centaur G and G-prime. The launch 
environment of the space shuttle was totally different than that of Atlas and Titan. Significant human rating 
requirements had to be addressed. The RL10 rocket engine had to be able to transition to the new Centaur design 
and shuttle environments with minimal changes. This included accommodating space shuttle environments, 
operating constraints, launch loads, different propellant mixture ratios, prelaunch cooling replaced with 
multirevolution/on-orbit chill-down, and accommodating new Centaur interfaces for the propulsion system. 
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Other Centaur design changes included 
 
 New propellant tank diameters and lengths 
 New conical transition to the LH2 tank 
 New propellant fill, drain, and dump system 
 New separation disconnects to separate the Centaur from the CISS and the shuttle 
 New aft adapter and separation ring 
 New forward adapter 
 New S-band transmitter and RF system compatible with the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System  
 Added system and component redundancies 
 New propellant isolation prevalves 
 Ability to handle multiday on-orbit operations 
 
From a vehicle design and integration standpoint, these technical design changes and interfaces were minor 
compared to the multitude of organizational interfaces. The organizational interfaces for Shuttle/Centaur included 
mission management, the Air Force, payload customers, NASA HQ, JSC, KSC, and finally the industrial 
contractors. The complexity of all these organizational interfaces was further compounded because most of these 
interfaces were “authoritative,” meaning they had the power to influence or stop the progress of the overall 
mission.13 Relationships and interfaces with JSC were particularly challenging. Part of the problem was that GRC 
was given leadership responsibility of a key element of the Space Transportation System, rather than MSFC. GRC 
was an outsider in the NASA world of human spaceflight. Another issue, as mentioned earlier, was that Centaur 
ultimately was managed as, and treated by JSC as, a shuttle payload, rather than an element of the shuttle program. 
Centaur had to be designed to meet the requirements and criteria of a shuttle payload, which were vastly different 
than an element. 
At the time the Shuttle/Centaur program was canceled in 1986 approximately a billion dollars had been spent, 
and two sets of flight articles (Centaur G-prime and CISS for SC-1 and SC-2), two G vehicles (approximately 50% 
complete), and one ground-test article were produced. The space shuttle did not return to flight until September 
1988. The Galileo mission to Jupiter was eventually launched in October 1989 using the less powerful IUS inside 
Space Shuttle Atlantis. The European Ulysses spacecraft was not launched until October 1990, also using the IUS, 
from Space Shuttle Discovery. A modified version of the Centaur G-prime ended up flying 16 times from 1994 to 
2003 as the upper stage on the Air Force’s Titan IV. This marked the return of Titan/Centaur, 17 years after the 
Voyager launches. Ironically, NASA decided to launch the Cassini mission to Saturn on a Titan IV/Centaur G-prime 
in 1997. The Cassini spacecraft was the last ELV payload integrated, managed, and launched by GRC.  
During the four main years of the Shuttle/Centaur program (1983 to 1986), GRC continued to manage and 
launch Atlas/Centaur. The Shuttle/Centaur Project Office existed in parallel with the Atlas/Centaur Project Office. 
Both project offices received launch vehicle engineering support from the Space Transportation Engineering 
Division, led by Steve Szabo. The two project offices and the engineering division were all within the Space 
Directorate at GRC. Total launch vehicle staffing at GRC during this period reached nearly 250 people. 
Separate from the major Centaur stage configuration changes (Atlas, Titan, Shuttle), GRC also co-led with 
industry other aspects of Centaur stage development and subsequent changes to the Centaur stage to improve 
performance and operability. In the 1960s, GRC led and performed structural tests for the Centaur equipment 
module, performed zero-gravity drop tower tests to better understand propellant behavior in low gravity, and 
developed a capacitance probe propellant utilization system to measure the propellant in the Centaur tanks. GRC 
engineers also developed a balanced thrust vent system to enable venting of the propellant tanks during in-space 
coast phases. In the 1970s, GRC was instrumental in the development of the Teledyne flight computer and flight 
software, the Honeywell guidance system, and a digital autopilot. In the 1980s, GRC led the elimination of the 
jettisonable insulation panels on the Centaur liquid hydrogen tank. The panels were replaced with fixed foam 
insulation. Also in the 1980s specifically for the AC-62 “stretched” Atlas G configuration (1984), GRC both 
eliminated the hydrogen-peroxide-powered boost pumps that increased propellant inlet pressures for the RL10 
engines and performed numerous RL10 engine performance improvements, including engine thrust and specific 
impulse increases. For example, a silver throat insert was added to the RL10 engine to increase expansion ratio and 
specific impulse. GRC also led the development of a new hydrazine-based reaction control system for AC-62. The 
previous system used hydrogen peroxide. Unfortunately, with all these changes to Atlas and Centaur in 1984, the 
AC-62 launch was a failure due to a Centaur oxygen leak in the intermediate bulkhead that was believed to have 
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occurred during Centaur’s separation from Atlas. Figure 9
shows the AC-62 vehicle during a prelaunch test at 
Launch Complex 36B at Cape Canaveral Air Force 
Station. 
GRC’s launch vehicle development efforts and 
accomplishments were not limited to the Centaur stage. 
The same roles, responsibilities, expertise, and philosophy 
that GRC brought to Centaur applied equally to the Atlas 
booster and its MA-5 propulsion system. GRC personnel 
had the same relationship and partnership with the 
industry contractors for Atlas (General Dynamics) and 
MA-5 (Rocketdyne), as they did with Centaur. Some of 
the Atlas launch vehicle developments and configuration 
changes that GRC led included 
 
 Structural strength testing at GRC’s Plum Brook 
E-stand of a full-scale Atlas D tank to demonstrate 
buckling strength capability and bending strength 
(in the 1960s) 
 Development of the SLV-3C Atlas with stretched 
propellant tanks (in 1966) 
 Development of the stretched Atlas G for AC-62 
(in 1984). Atlas G was 81 inches longer than the 
previous Atlas configuration 
 Development of the Atlas H configuration for 
DoD launches from Vandenberg Air Force Base 
 Development of numerous Atlas MA-5 propulsion 
system upgrades (1963 to 1989), including booster 
and sustainer engine thrust increase, elimination of 
the vernier roll-control engines, and a 
computerized Atlas propellant loading system 
V. Other LeRC ELV Leadership Accomplishments 
The Challenger accident in 1986 changed everything. NASA realized putting all its eggs into the space shuttle 
basket was a mistake; the country became too dependent on the space shuttle at a time when foreign countries (i.e., 
Europe’s Ariane) were taking over the ELV market and commercial space business. Further, NASA realized that 
risking human lives on space missions that did not require humans was unwise. In December 1986, President 
Reagan issued a directive stipulating that NASA would no longer launch satellites for private companies or foreign 
governments, unless they required a human presence in space or involved national security. This decision took the 
shuttle out of competition with ELVs for revenue-generating business.14 The idea of maintaining a “mixed fleet” of 
ELVs of various sizes and payload capabilities emerged in 1987 when NASA’s Mixed Fleet Study was completed. 
GRC chaired the procurement development team for this study. Soon after this, in 1988, the concept of buying 
launch services instead of launch vehicles emerged. GRC was at the forefront of this transition. 
Up until this time, NASA bought ELVs and was responsible for integrating them with payloads and launching 
them. For example, with Atlas/Centaur, GRC had separate contracts with General Dynamics for the Atlas and 
Centaur vehicles, Pratt & Whitney for the RL10 engines, Rocketdyne for the Atlas MA-5 engines, Teledyne for the 
Centaur flight computer, and Honeywell for the Centaur guidance system. GRC was responsible for taking delivery 
of all of these hardware elements and integrating them together with General Dynamics into the final integrated 
vehicle. Pratt & Whitney, Rocketdyne, Teledyne, and Honeywell were not subcontractors to General Dynamics. 
They were referred to as associate contractors. Their contracts were with GRC and they delivered their products to 
GRC. GRC then transferred these deliverables as GFE to General Dynamics, who performed the overall vehicle 
integration and tests. GRC was also responsible for integrating the payload and supporting KSC in launching the 
rockets from Air-Force-owned launch pads. GRC also owned the RL10 test stands at Pratt & Whitney. NASA was 
responsible for the launch and the mission success. If there was a failure, NASA was responsible for the failure 
reviews. If a private company or another government agency wanted to launch their satellite on Atlas/Centaur, they 
 
Figure 9. AC-62 during prelaunch test at Launch 
Complex 36B (photographed by the author). 
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had to approach GRC to procure and integrate the vehicle and manage the launch. This was the era of ELVs, from 
1963 to 1989. 
In 1987 the transition to launch services began. NASA would no longer buy vehicles, but would contract with 
commercial launch vehicle providers to buy their service to launch a particular payload into space. The launch 
vehicle provider became responsible for everything. In the case of Atlas/Centaur; Rocketdyne, Pratt & Whitney, 
Honeywell, and Teledyne became subcontractors to General Dynamics. All of the NASA-owned property, 
equipment, and other assets was turned over to industry as part of a barter agreement in exchange for launching the 
Combined Release and Radiation Effects Satellite (CRRES) on AC-69. This barter agreement was an element 
(condition) of the Geosynchronous Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) launch services contract 
negotiation. GOES became NASA’s first commercial launch services contract and represented a milestone in the 
effort to commercialize the launch vehicle industry.15 AC-68, launched on September 25, 1989, carrying a 
FLTSATCOM satellite, was the last GRC-managed and -integrated mission of the “launch vehicle” era. GRC had 
managed 112 launches over a 26-year period. From this point forward, NASA would purchase launch services rather 
than launch vehicles. Staffing levels at GRC for launch services support dropped to 50 to 70 people. In July 1990, 
the first commercial launch of a NASA mission occurred with the launch of CRRES on AC-69. The new era of 
commercial space and launch services had begun. The barter agreement paved the way for the commercialization of 
Atlas/Centaur. It continues to this day with Centaur still flying as the upper stage of Atlas, now referred to as Atlas 
V. A very similar upper stage flies atop the Delta 4 launch vehicle. Today there are many other commercial launch 
providers, including Orbital Science, SpaceX, and United Launch Alliance (ULA, a Boeing/Lockheed Martin joint 
venture). Ariane continues to fly for Europe, as do ELVs from other foreign countries including Japan and Russia. In 
2012 ULA celebrated the 200th flight of Centaur. ULA is currently developing the next generation of Centaur. It is 
perhaps ironic and remarkable to note that while Centaur still flies today, the space shuttle (which almost caused the 
termination of Centaur and ELVs) does not. 
During the 1990s, the first decade of launch services, GRC was responsible for procuring launch services for 
intermediate and large ELVs (i.e., Atlas/Centaur and Titan). Although these were launch services, GRC still 
maintained some responsibilities including independent verification and validation (IV&V), leading-edge 
integration, independent analyses, mission design analyses, flight readiness assessments, supported spacecraft 
integration, and any NASA mission unique or peculiar requirements. For example, the Earth Observing System 
(EOS) AM-1 spacecraft had several mission-peculiar requirements that drove significant modifications to the 
baseline vehicle, including a new extended payload fairing, unique payload adapter and separation system, and a 
strengthened Centaur equipment module for the heavy and larger EOS payload. The EOS AM-1 spacecraft was 
originally designed to launch on the much more powerful Titan launch vehicle. When the change was made for 
budgetary reasons to launch on Atlas/Centaur, the spacecraft had to be downsized, but it still ended up being an 
unusually large and heavy payload for Atlas/Centaur. GRC performed all of the IV&V analyses of the new designs, 
the structural test program, and the combined spacecraft/launch vehicle environment. EOS AM-1 was launched in 
December 1999 from a new Atlas launch complex (SLC-3E) at Vandenberg Air Force Base. This was the very first 
launch of an Atlas with a Centaur upper stage from Vandenberg. Other missions that GRC supported during this 
decade included CRRES (AC-69), Mars Observer (Titan III), GOES (AC-73, AC-77), SOHO (AC-121), and Cassini 
(Titan IV/Centaur). 
In managing ELV launch services, GRC employed a variety of matrixed analysis capabilities to verify and 
validate mission planning and launch preparations. Typical activities included loads analyses, dynamics analyses, 
stability and control analyses, flight software IV&V, guidance analyses, and trajectory/performance analyses. These 
independent analyses in critical or high-risk areas, using independently derived mathematical models, were then 
compared with the contractor’s results. In 1998, a NASA “Zero Base Review” directed that all NASA ELV 
programs be transferred to KSC. This included GRC’s responsibilities for intermediate- and large-class ELV launch 
services (i.e., Atlas/Centaur and Titan), as well as Goddard Space Flight Center’s responsibility for small and 
medium class ELV launch services (i.e., Delta). This marked the end of GRC’s long, 35-year association with 
Centaur and ELVs. 
GRC led the creation of a new contractual means for the government to launch spacecraft. The transition from 
“launch vehicle” to “launch services,” where NASA contracts with industry following 30+ years of maturation of 
ELVs, enabled the government to streamline and pursue a cost-effective way to launch spacecraft by purchasing a 
service rather than the actual hardware. GRC pioneered the commercial launch services culture and was the first to 
implement the new national space policy on commercialization through innovative contracting provisions that have 
become the standard for NASA and DoD. GRC’s pioneering launch services methods enabled NASA to retain 
technical insight while keeping costs low.  
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VI. Thoughts on the Future 
It is hard to imagine today a program or project being managed and integrated like Centaur was. Times have 
changed, the environment is different, the industry has matured, and the roles of government and industry have 
evolved. A trusting, collaborative relationship between government and industry, like Centaur enjoyed, may be a 
relic of the past, but it is nevertheless something to strive for. The basic tenets of GRC’s launch vehicle management 
philosophy are sound and relevant today: strong leadership; highly competent staff with deep technical knowledge, 
experience, and tools; well-defined roles and responsibilities, processes, and procedures; and a profound drive for 
mission success. The government’s role needs to be more than just insight and oversight of the contractor. The 
“deep technical knowledge” of the staff needs to be allowed access to the contractor’s design, development, 
production, and operations. This penetration need not be adversarial but rather in a spirit of collaboration, teamwork, 
and mutual trust for the common good of the mission—a “win-win” situation. This proposition will lead to much 
debate and many questions. Is this expensive, bureaucratic, unnecessary overkill? Shouldn’t the government step 
back and stay out of industry’s way? Isn’t this “old school” and contrary to commercialization? Does the 
government (NASA) even have the personnel with deep technical knowledge and experience anymore? These are all 
valid questions that need to be thoughtfully considered by leaders, stakeholders, and customers.  
What is the next Centaur? There are many launch vehicles and space transportation systems flying successfully 
today. SpaceX, with their Falcon launch vehicles and Dragon capsule, is one example. NASA’s Space Launch 
System heavy lift booster and Orion Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle are well into their development. Future in-space 
transportation systems likely will be higher performing than Centaur or any other chemical propulsion stage or 
spacecraft. Nuclear thermal propulsion with its high specific impulse and high thrust or solar electric propulsion 
(SEP) with its very high specific impulse (and low thrust) are being considered for future solar system missions and 
destinations, such as Mars and for the Asteroid Redirect Mission. The lessons learned from Centaur, and there are 
many, should be heeded as well as the techniques and philosophy employed by GRC. 
GRC is leading the development of SEP and in-space SEP transfer stages/spacecraft development. As 
revolutionary as Centaur was in the 1960s in terms of high-energy performance and new capability development to 
enable new missions, SEP is this generation’s Centaur. Hopefully some of the management and integration tenets 
for Centaur will be applied to SEP and other future space transportation systems. 
VII. Conclusion 
The success and longevity of Centaur can be attributed to GRC’s strong leadership, technical competency, and 
management philosophy for launch vehicle integration. Although this paper is about GRC’s role, one should not 
undervalue the role of General Dynamics and the other industry partners that equally share in the success of Centaur. 
It was a true team effort and collaboration. Although GRC managed and led the launch vehicle integration, as well 
as the development of the Centaur upper stage, the work was largely done by a team of industry partners under 
contract to GRC. However, GRC did far more than just manage the contracts and provide oversight and insight. The 
GRC launch vehicle team worked side-by-side with their industry counterparts on almost all aspects of Centaur 
development and integration, including the major configuration changes described in this paper. The GRC team had 
longevity, continuity, and the corporate knowledge of launch vehicles and Centaur. GRC’s knowledge of every 
detail of Centaur, down to individual components such as valves and fasteners, sometimes exceeded that of industry. 
Both GRC and industry personnel had immense pride in Centaur and their contributions to its success. Each launch 
culminated a multiyear “intimate relationship” life cycle with that particular vehicle. Each vehicle had its own 
unique history, pedigree, and problems to overcome that the team lived and breathed every day. It was exhilarating 
when the launch was successful and devastating when the launch ended in failure. Centaur continues to be the 
workhorse, high-energy upper stage for the nation. Go Atlas. Go Centaur. 
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